

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

OTIS MICHAEL BRIDGEFORTH,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	Civ. Action No. 13-062-GMS
)	
NEW CASTLE COUNTY POLICE)	
DEPARTMENT, et al.,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

MEMORANDUM

The plaintiff, Otis Michael Bridgeforth ("Bridgeforth"), filed this lawsuit on January 9, 2013, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (D.I. 4.) He appears *pro se* and was granted permission to proceed *in forma pauperis* pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (D.I. 6.) The court now proceeds to review and screen the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

I. BACKGROUND

Bridgeforth alleges that the defendants have used racial slurs against him and that he is the victim of habitual retaliation and harassment by the defendants all in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. More particularly, Bridgeforth alleges that on January 7, 2013, the mayor's council held a meeting wherein it was agreed to kill, retaliate, and habitually harass Bridgeforth. Bridgeforth alleges that later he became alarmed and offended when either he, or a witness, received a threatening voicemail. The next day, January 8, 2013, Bridgeforth received a notice of warrant for his arrest, attached as an exhibit to the complaint.¹ The notice of warrant for arrest is dated January 7, 2013.

¹Bridgeforth refers to this as a "mysterious letter."

Bridgeforth states that when he received the notice of the warrant for arrest he connected it to the voicemail. Bridgeforth appears to allege that the foregoing is in retaliation “based upon a 2010 unlawful Sussex County fugitive warrant returned with no jurisdiction by the NCCPD” (i.e., New Castle County Police Department). (*See* D.I. 4.)

Bridgeforth seeks compensatory damages and the termination of the city officers involved. In addition, Bridgeforth filed a temporary restraining order. (D.I. 1.) While not clear, it appears that he wishes the court to intervene and protect him from harm.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain *in forma pauperis* and actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (*in forma pauperis* actions). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a *pro se* plaintiff. *Phillips v. County of Allegheny*, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008); *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Because Bridgeforth proceeds *pro se*, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. at 94 (citations omitted).

An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario. *Neitzke*, 490 at 327-28; *Wilson v. Rackmill*, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); *see, e.g., Deutsch v. United States*, 67 F.3d 1080,

1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took an inmate's pen and refused to give it back).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions. *Tourscher v. McCullough*, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the court must grant Bridgeforth leave to amend his complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. *See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements." *Id.* at 678. When determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the court conducts a two-part analysis. *Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside*, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. *Id.* The court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. *Id.* at 210-11. Second, the court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that Bridgeforth has a "plausible claim for relief."² *Id.* at 211. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege

²A claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570). The plausibility standard "asks for more than a sheer

Bridgeforth's entitlement to relief; rather it must "show" such an entitlement with its facts. *Id.* "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not shown - that the pleader is entitled to relief." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

III. DISCUSSION

Bridgeforth filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging retaliation. When bringing a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

"Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution actionable under § 1983." *White v. Napoleon*, 897 F.2d 103, 111-12 (3d Cir. 1990). Proof of a retaliation claim requires a demonstration that Bridgeforth: (1) engaged in protected activity; (2) was subjected to adverse actions by a state actor; and (3) the protected activity was a substantial motivating factor in the state actor's decision to take adverse action. *Carter v. McGrady*, 292 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing *Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle*, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); see also *Allah v. Seiverling*, 229 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000) (a factfinder could conclude that retaliatory placement in administrative confinement would "deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First Amendment rights" (citations omitted))). The allegations in the complaint do not rise to the level of a retaliation claim.


possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." *Id.* "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" *Id.*

Moreover, the complaint does not speak to personal involvement by any of the named defendants. Finally, the allegations are conclusory, somewhat delusional, and, in this court's experience, do not state a plausible claim for relief. Therefore, the court will dismiss the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the court will dismiss the complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Amendment is futile. The court will deny as moot the motion for a temporary restraining order. (D.I. 1.)

An appropriate order will be entered.



CHIEF, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Jan 29, 2013
Wilmington, Delaware